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3ROLWLFDO2SSRUWXQLWLHVDQGWKH5ROHRI
%HUVLK
&KDQ7VX&KRQJ
Abstract: The 14th general election (GE14) in Malaysia saw a democratic 
breakthrough as the Barisan Nasional’s uninterrupted rule since independ-
ence finally came to an end. This article seeks to analyse the role and im-
pact of the Bersih movement in GE14 by examining the political context 
of GE14 via three key political opportunities: the 1MDB scandal; electoral 
fraud and manipulation; and the re-delineation of electoral boundaries. 
Bersih’s core campaigns, actions, and strategies in response to these polit-
ical opportunities will be analysed based on information and insights gen-
erated from the author’s involvement as a member of Bersih’s secretariat. 
The political opportunity resulting from the 1MDB scandal gave room for 
civil society and the opposition to go on the offensive; Bersih took the 
lead and continued the tradition of coalition-building between civil society 
and opposition forces, and brought focus to cross-ethnic issues. At the 
same time, Bersih held firm in its agenda for electoral reform by continu-
ing to consistently monitor and mobilise against electoral fraud and ma-
nipulation leading up to GE14. Via the re-delineation exercise, it mobilised 
and coordinated resistance by increasing civic participation in the consti-
tutional process and created new areas of contestation via the judiciary. In 
parallel, Bersih’s efforts and strategies towards these political opportuni-
ties had created conditions that contributed towards Pakatan Harapan’s 
victory in GE14. 
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,QWURGXFWLRQ
Malaysia’s predominant political coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN), held 
power for over 60 years after the country’s independence in 1957. As a 
competitive authoritarian regime, formal democratic institutions and pro-
cesses were limitedly present – but were in reality abused and manipulated 
by the incumbent regime to retain political power (Levitsky and Way 2002). 
Over the years, therefore, the ruling party in Malaysia had systematically 
controlled both political and economic power. This was done through 
constitution amendments, patronage and race-based politics, manipula-
tion of the electoral system, repression of freedom and rights, and the ex-
ertion of control over parliament, the judiciary, and the media (Case 2001; 
Croissant and Lorenz 2018; Lee 2007; Liu 2014).
In particular, elections in Malaysia were not free and fair, and were 
systematically manipulated to provide an unfair political advantage to the 
ruling government (Ostwald 2017; Welsh 2014).1 The Election Commis-
sion (EC) was appointed on the binding advice of the prime minister, and 
lacks independence. Electoral boundaries were heavily manipulated, re-
sulting in severe malapportionment and gerrymandering (Wong 2018). 
Electoral monitoring groups have documented widespread bribery, fraud, 
and phantom voters during elections (see for example, Bersih2.0, Komas, 
and Suaram 2018). The People’s Tribunal on Malaysia’s 13th general elec-
tion (GE13) in 2013 – a civil society-initiated inquiry consisting of five 
non-partisan experts to assess the conduct of this election – concluded in 
its final report that: 
There were multiple failings in the way GE13 was conducted, and 
that virtually every tenet of a fair election was violated at one place 
and at some time. (Bersih2.0 2014: 17) 
An unexpected breakthrough happened, meanwhile, in the Malaysian 14th 
general election (GE14), which took place on 9 May 2018. Prior to GE14, 
the vast majority of political analysts, activists, and opposition politicians 
were sceptical about the possibility of regime change (Merdeka Center for 
Opinion Research 2018; Ong and Kow 2018; Kaur 2018b; Yeoh 2018). 
This was understandable, considering the tight control that the ruling party 

1  See, for example, Lim (2002); the findings and conclusions of the People’s Tri-
bunal on Malaysia’s 13th general election (Bersih2.0 2014); and the Election Ob-
servation Report of the 14th Malaysian general election (Bersih2.0, Komas, and 
Suaram 2018). 
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had over state resources and machinery, prevailing weaknesses and chal-
lenges faced by the opposition, and given also the continuing manipulation 
of the electoral system (Bersih2.0 2018f).
It was, therefore, surprising when GE14 in fact resulted in the end of 
the BN regime’s uninterrupted rule ever since independence. The Pakatan 
Harapan (PH) coalition won 113 parliamentary seats and formed the gov-
ernment together with its ally, the Warisan Party – who won 8 seats. BN 
won 79 seats, while the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) won 18 seats, the 
Homeland Solidarity Party (STAR) won 1 seat, and independent candi-
dates won 3 seats (Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia 2018). The PH coa-
lition formed the government in eight states, PAS in two, and BN in three 
states.2 
GE14 was also significant because, for the first time in the nation’s 
history, there was a transition of power. This transition was successful and 
peaceful, without any disruption or violence. The GE14 breakthrough was, 
by any measure, therefore an amazing feat considering the authoritarian 
political environment in Malaysia – and also the regional and global con-
text of a “democracy in crisis,” where more countries are suffering demo-
cratic setbacks than gains (Freedom House 2018).
&LYLO6RFLHW\DQG'HPRFUDWLVDWLRQ
What were the causes of the unprecedented and astonishing event of the 
BN regime losing the election and power? Many factors were at play here. 
Voters’ frustrations about corruption, especially the 1MDB scandal, and 
the rising cost of living (Tay 2018) drove public support away from BN – 
including from its traditional support base. Mahathir Mohamad, previ-
ously prime minister for 22 years under the BN coalition before turning 
and leading the opposition during GE14, was another crucial factor. As 
the chairperson and prime minister candidate for PH, he provided leader-
ship and stability within the opposition coalition. More importantly, Ma-
hathir provided trust and security among the Malay electorate (Ibrahim 
2018) – a crucial voter segment whose support is imperative for victory in 
Malaysian elections. 
Undeniably, one other key factor which contributed to the demo-
cratic breakthrough in Malaysia was the role of civil society. Definitions 
of “civil society” are aplenty, and have evolved continuously over time. In 
contemporary terms, however, there are several core attributes: independ-
ence from the state and private capital; self-organisation; deliberation; and, 

2  This includes the state of Sarawak, which had held its state elections separately 
in 2016. 
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civility (Wheatley 2010). Although civil society can both expand and con-
tract democratic spaces, its existence is a necessary condition and one that 
has been at the forefront of political liberation, political reform, and dem-
ocratic transitions – such as in Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Ko-
rea (Alagappa 2004). 
Likewise in Malaysia, civil society has had a long and active role in 
politics. From a historical-institutionalism standpoint, civil society devel-
oped and changed after independence in 1957 via three critical junctures: 
the period of nation-state-building in 1957; the 1969 communal riots; and, 
the 1987 Operation Lalang and beyond – including the 1999 Reformasi 
movement (Giersdorf 2011). In more contemporary times, the rise of peo-
ples’ movements such as the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (Ber-
sih), Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf), and Himpunan Hijau had cre-
ated shockwaves and contributed to the “political tsunami” and the oppo-
sition’s success in both the 2008 and the 2013 general elections. 
3ROLWLFDO2SSRUWXQLWLHVDQGWKH5ROHRI%HUVLKLQ
*(
This article will take a closer look at the role and impact of one key civil 
society actor in the democratic breakthrough during GE14: the Bersih 
movement. Formally known as the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections, 
Bersih was founded in 2005 as a coalition by five political parties and 25 
civil society groups to campaign for electoral reform. In 2011, Bersih was 
relaunched as BERSIH2.0 and transformed into a non-partisan movement 
comprising and led by civil society (Khoo 2016). As of 20 March 2018, 
Bersih was comprised of 92 endorsing non-governmental organisations 
working on different issues (Bersih2.0 2018b). Bersih is also the largest 
people’s movement in Malaysia, and is most known for organising five 
major rallies in the past decade to demand electoral reform and greater 
democracy for Malaysia. The movement has inspired various “acts of cit-
izenship” and civic participation in political affairs beyond the mere cast-
ing of ballot papers every five years (Khoo 2018). 
While the impetus behind its founding was the desire for electoral 
reform, the origins and development of Bersih have also been closely tied 
to the frustration of the general populace with the BN regime. The success 
of the first Bersih rally in 2007, for example, was in the context of rising 
fuel prices and the failure of then prime minister Abdullah Badawi to in-
stitute promised reforms (Khoo 2014). In the Bersih 2 and 3 rallies, par-
ticipation was partly driven by voters’ anger about the government’s im-
posed restriction on freedom of assembly and the police’s hard-handed 
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crackdown on protestors. As a movement Bersih provided leadership in 
advancing democracy in Malaysia, and it became a common platform for 
citizens to rise up against corruption, the abuse of power, and weak public 
institutions. 
The article seeks to analyse, then, the role and impact of Bersih in 
GE14, by examining the political context via three key political opportunities: 
the 1MDB scandal; electoral fraud and manipulation; and, the re-delinea-
tion of electoral boundaries. “Opportunity” refers to one of the compo-
nents of collective action and “concerns the relationship between a group 
and the world around it” (Tilly 1978: 11). The political opportunity ap-
proach emerged from decades of research on social movement behaviour 
and outcomes; although it has been widely researched and used in studies 
involving social movements and contentious politics, there is, however, 
no general consensus on the political opportunity concept as it continues 
to be reviewed, criticised, and developed (see, for example, Meyer 2004; 
Giugni 2011). Nevertheless, the underlying point of the political oppor-
tunity approach is that activists’ goals, strategies, and success are all de-
pendent on the surrounding external context (Meyer 2004) – that is, polit-
ical opportunities. 
In parallel, Bersih’s core campaigns, actions, and tactics in response 
to these political opportunities will be analysed to determine how they af-
fected GE14. This will provide some detailed insights into the work and 
strategy of Bersih, and how it contributed to the democratic change wit-
nessed. This is largely based on primary information and observation, 
given the author’s involvement as a member of Bersih’s operating secre-
tariat. Media reports, press statements, and other information obtained 
from social media are also used in exploring the political opportunities as 
well as Bersih’s actions. 
7KH0'%6FDQGDO±.OHSWRFUDF\DW,WV:RUVW
Dubbed as “kleptocracy at its worst” (Reuters 2017), the 1MDB corruption 
scandal needs no further introduction as allegedly more than USD 4.5 bil-
lion of funds were laundered through a series of complex and bogus com-
panies worldwide. Initially set up as a strategic development company 
wholly owned by the government, 1MDB first came to public scrutiny 
when Tony Pua, member of parliament for Petaling Jaya Utara, started 
raising questions in parliament about the company in 2010 (Pua 2010). 
However, it was not until 2015 that 1MDB would explode into a full-
blown scandal following the exposés by whistleblowing site Sarawak Re-
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port (2015) and by the Wall Street Journal (see Wright and Clark 2015), es-
pecially on how MYR 42 million from SRC International (a 1MDB sub-
sidiary company) and USD 681 million from 1MDB had been transferred 
into Najib Razak’s personal bank account. 
Internal cracks within Najib Razak’s party started to surface, led by 
then deputy prime minister Muhyiddin Yassin, who broke his silence on 
the issue, and by former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, who had in 
the preceding year withdrew his support for Najib Razak (Yunus 2014). 
As political and public pressure continued to increase, Najib Razak even-
tually admitted publicly that MYR 2.6 billion had indeed been transferred 
into his private account – but justified it as a political “donation” (Hamid 
and Ariff 2015). A special task force consisting of the attorney general, 
Central Bank governor, inspector-general of the police, and chief commis-
sioner of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) was set up 
by the government to investigate the matter. 
The 1MDB scandal continued to snowball, and Najib Razak then 
took steps to protect his position. Muhyiddin Yassin, Attorney General 
Abdul Gani Patail, along with four other ministers who had questioned 
Najib Razak on 1MDB were all removed from their positions (Teoh 2015). 
The 1MDB special task force was disbanded, and four members of the 
Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee who were conducting inquiries 
into 1MDB were made deputy ministers (Amly 2015). Najib Razak was 
subsequently cleared by the new attorney general on all corruption charges 
related to 1MDB. 
At the international level, however, the 1MDB scandal continued to 
simmer as investigations into financial irregularities and money laundering 
were conducted in at least nine separate countries: Australia, Hong Kong, 
Luxembourg, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. In July 2016, the US Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) announced action under the Kleptocracy Asset Re-
covery Initiative to recover more than USD 1 billion in assets associated 
with funds laundered from 1MDB (DOJ 2016). Documents filed by the 
DOJ detailed how the funds were misappropriated and spent on, among 
other things, luxury real estate properties, a Pablo Picasso painting, a lux-
ury yacht, and the production of The Wolf of Wall Street. 
 
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&RDOLWLRQ%XLOGLQJDQG6WUHQJWKHQLQJWKH
2SSRVLWLRQ¶V3RVLWLRQ
Bersih played a crucial role in the 1MDB scandal by mobilising citizens to 
the streets to protest against it. On 29 July 2016, a couple of days after 
Najib Razak had removed Gani Patail as the attorney general and Muhy-
iddin Yassin as the deputy prime minister, Bersih responded by announc-
ing its first mass rally since GE13, under the leadership of Maria Chin 
Abdullah. In a press statement, the movement announced that Bersih 4 
would be held on 29–30 August 2016, called for the resignation of Najib 
Razak as prime minister, and listed four broad demands3 and 10 key insti-
tutional reforms.4 Following the DOJ’s announcement of action against 
1MDB in 2016, the movement again called for the Bersih 5 rally – starting 
with a nationwide “convoy” from October 2017 onwards, and culminating 
in a mass rally on 19 November 2017. In both of these rallies, Bersih 
worked closely with the opposition political parties within PH to mobilise 
and organise logistics. 
The increasingly close working relationship between Bersih and op-
position political parties, and its decision to make a partisan demand for 
the resignation of Najib Razak, caused it to be accused of being “pro-
opposition” (see, for example, Mustafa 2015; The Star Online 2016; Lok-
man 2016). Critics, including supporters, also pointed out their disagree-
ment with Bersih’s divergence from its goal of fighting for electoral reform, 
and that the rallies were often “hijacked” by the opposition (see, for ex-
ample, Haleem 2015; Buang 2015; Baharom 2015). The state and main-
stream media responded by propagating the idea that Bersih represents a 
political agenda by the opposition to topple the government (Lim and 
Wong 2018).  
However, cooperation and coalition-building between civil society 
and opposition political parties in Malaysia is nothing new. In the context 
of competitive authoritarianism, civil society could challenge the regime in 
the electoral arena by supporting opposition parties and advocating for 

3  The four demands are: clean elections; clean governments; save our economy; 
and, right to dissent.  
4  The 10 institutional reforms are: electoral reform; making the Election Commis-
sion a constitutional party answerable to parliament; barring Prime Minister from 
simultaneously holding the office of Finance Minister; parliamentary reform; 
making MACC answerable to parliament; separating Attorney General from the 
role of Public Prosecutor; freedom of information laws at the federal and state 
levels; the public declaration of ministers and senior government servants’ assets; 
repeal of amendments to draconian laws; and, the establishment of the Inde-
pendent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission (IPCMC). 
  116 Chan Tsu Chong 

reform policies (Giersdorf 2011). Coalition capital had historically been 
developed and utilised in the 1999 general election, where civil society and 
political society worked together in the Reformasi movement and Barisan 
Alternatif coalition – making significant opposition gains in the 1999 gen-
eral election (Weiss 2006). Coalition capital enabled groups to relinquish 
their narrow interests to focus instead on a broader reform agenda that 
cut across ethnic and economic lines.  
In the case of Bersih, coalition capital and cooperation between civil 
society and political parties were present from the very beginning – as the 
movement was founded in 2005 as a coalition by five political parties and 
25 civil society groups. Although members of the coalition had different 
ideals and areas of focus, Bersih concentrated on the common agenda of 
electoral reform. The close cooperation between civil society and opposi-
tion political parties was instrumental in the success of the Bersih rallies 
and in making electoral reform a mainstream agenda in Malaysian politics 
during the 2008 and 2013 general elections.  
In mobilising citizens to the streets regarding the 1MDB scandal, Ber-
sih continued the tradition of coalition-building between civil society and 
political society in Malaysia – and, in so doing, strengthened the opposi-
tion forces during GE14. The leadership provided by the movement – in 
being the first to mobilise against the 1MDB scandal during Bersih 4 – 
was critical, because at that juncture opposition political parties were not 
in the position to rally supporters and to capitalise on political opportuni-
ties because the Pakatan Rakyat coalition was in disarray and in the process 
of collapsing with the departure of PAS. The Bersih 4 and Bersih 5 pro-
tests were critical for the opposition political parties to rally citizens against 
the 1MDB scandal, to gather popular support, and to maintain political 
pressure on the regime. The 1MDB scandal, which was at the centre of 
both rallies in 2015 and 2016, continued to be a key campaign issue during 
GE14 – one that contributed to the electoral defeat of BN (FMT Reporters 
2017b).  
On 4 March 2016, the Citizen’s Declaration was jointly launched to 
demand the resignation of Najib Razak as well as a series of reforms 
(Hakam 2016). The Citizen’s Declaration initiative was another important 
step in coalition-building, as it was the first formal platform that brought 
together previously conflicting political leaders and parties – most notably 
Mahathir and Anwar Ibrahim – and was the precursor to the formation of 
PH. Maria Chin Abdullah, then chairperson of Bersih, and Ambiga Sree-
nevasan, former chairperson of Bersih, were among the initial signatories 
to the declaration and continued to play an important role in asserting 
demands for institutional reform leading up to GE14. 
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Similar to the Reformasi movement in 1999 and to the 2008 general 
election where civil society developed and “exported” new cross-ethnic 
and cross-religious agendas into the political sphere, the coalition between 
Bersih and opposition parties in the lead-up to GE14 continued this effect 
and played an important role in providing an alternative platform – one 
that was more issue-based than personalistic or ethno-religious-based 
(Weiss 2009). As highlighted earlier, Bersih’s scope and role expanded to 
include wider demands – especially on institutional reform. In the Malay-
sian context, where political contestation has historically predominantly 
been along ethnic and religious lines and where, post-GE13, religious and 
ethno-nationalist politics were making a comeback (Noor 2013), this was 
important for ensuring that progressive voices were present in the public 
political sphere. It also served as an important platform for the newly 
formed PH coalition, especially their candidate for prime minister, Ma-
hathir, to demonstrate their commitment to reform to voters sceptical 
about the PH’s agenda. In an ironic twist of fate, Mahathir was among 
those who called for support and participated in the Bersih 4 and Bersih 
5 rallies (The Straits Times 2016) – despite his previously rejection and 
cracking down on public assemblies during his time as prime minister.
(OHFWRUDO0DQLSXODWLRQDQG)UDXG
Democracy in Malaysia has had various labels applied to it – such as quasi-
democracy, semi-democracy, soft authoritarianism, illiberal democracy, 
ambiguous regimes, and electoral regime. Two key ever-present issues are, 
nevertheless, that elections have not been free and fair and there was never 
a change in the governing party (Wong, Chin, and Othman 2010). Alt-
hough there was a “protracted transition” towards electoral democracy in 
the wake of GE13 (Ufen 2013), underlying structural problems in the elec-
toral system – namely, independence of the EC, malapportionment and 
gerrymandering, disenfranchisement of voters, access to media, phantom 
voters, absence of political financing and caretaker government legisla-
tions, and lack of enforcement against vote-buying and other electoral of-
fenses – remained and indeed worsened over time (Chan 2018; Bersih2.0, 
Komas, and Suaram 2018; Bersih2.0 2014). 
On the issue of the electoral roll, for example, irregularities and flaws 
remained as a key issue during GE14 despite having being highlighted for 
many years – including by the 2011 Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Electoral Reform. Since 2015 onwards, political parties and civil society 
organisations such as Bersih detected and documented fraudulent trans-
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fers of voters into several constituencies that were won or lost only mar-
ginally in the last election (Bersih2.0, Komas, and Suaram 2018). In the 
federal constituency of Bukit Katil, which had been won marginally by the 
opposition in GE13, 32 voters were simultaneously transferred into the 
constituency using identical home addresses, while a further 41 voters 
were transferred in using incomplete ones (Ho 2017). In 2017 the EC al-
lowed the transfer of 3,724 military voters into three army camps that were 
still under construction and did not even exist yet. The three camps were 
“coincidentally” situated in marginal constituencies held by cabinet minis-
ters, including the then deputy prime minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi 
(Alhadjri 2017). A week before GE14 polling day, Bersih and Engage re-
leased their findings on electoral roll problems. These included, inter alia: 
irregular movement of voters; inconsistencies in personal details; and, in-
complete addresses of voters (Bersih2.0 2018e). 
The EC also suppressed and disenfranchised voters. Recent elections 
in Malaysia suggest that higher voter turnout favours PH (Lim 2018; Boo 
2014), as it means lower apathy and greater proactivity on the part of vot-
ers to go against the regime (Kaur 2018a). Likewise, new voters – a major-
ity of whom are young and first-time ones – are more likely to support the 
opposition as they have better access to alternative news sources. Most 
notably, on 10 April 2018, the EC held a press conference in Putrajaya to 
announce the dates of nomination and polling day. The EC unexpectedly 
announced 9 May 2018 – a weekday – as the polling day. Although the law 
provides discretion for the EC to set the polling day, it offered no expla-
nation as to why a weekend – which would have been much more accom-
modating of voters – was not chosen instead. The EC shockingly refused 
to answer any questions from reporters, deciding instead to just end the 
press conference after making the announcements and simply walk away. 
A weekday polling day would inconvenience an estimated 1.7 million to 
3.5 million (Khor 2018) “outstation” voters, meaning those who have to 
travel back to their hometowns to vote.  
Voter disenfranchisement was also practised long before GE14. 
From 2013 the EC had made it harder for citizens to register as voters, by 
arbitrarily removing and restricting the appointment of assistant registrar 
officers (AROs)5 from political parties and many NGOs – even though 
they were the most proactive in registering new voters.6 This resulted in 

5  An eligible citizen must first be registered as a voter before he or she can vote. 
Voter registration can be done at EC offices, post offices, selected government 
departments, or directly via AROs appointed by the EC. 
6  In 2017, there were 205 AROs from civil society as compared to 5,720 in 2011 
(Teo 2017), many of who have been found to have close links to BN (Bersih2.0 
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4.1 million eligible citizens not being registered to vote, as announced by 
the EC in March 2017 (Bernama 2017) – constituting some 22 per cent of 
the total citizens eligible to register and vote in Malaysia. In addition sys-
tematic abuse of the voter registration process occurred in targeted areas, 
especially in Selangor from 2015 onwards. In most cases objections against 
the registration of new voters were filed by members of United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO) randomly based on race and on areas 
likely to be supportive of PH, while in 2016 the number of such cases were 
estimated to amount to more than 1,500 for each registration quarter (Ong 
2017). 
As GE14 drew nearer, incidences of vote-buying increased under the 
guise of government or welfare programmes (The Straits Times 2018). On 
the same day that parliament dissolved, Najib Razak launched BN’s GE14 
manifesto and announced significant increases in the government’s BR1M 
cash aid programme – which would cost the government an additional 
MYR 3.71 billion (The Star Online 2018), even though he was only acting 
in a caretaker government role. Five days later, Najib Razak launched the 
1Malaysia taxi aid programme, whereby 67,000 taxi drivers would receive 
MYR 8,000 each (Zainal 2018). At the local level, vote-buying was the 
norm as candidates were openly handing out gifts to voters – ranging from 
essential goods like rice and oil to via more creative means, like prize draws 
offering electrical appliances and MYR 25,000 cash to voters attending the 
campaign events (Pemantau 2018).  
(OHFWRUDO0RQLWRULQJDQG0RELOLVDWLRQ
Electoral manipulation and irregularities, as described above, have been a 
key political opportunity and were at the forefront of contestation in the 
2008 and 2013 general elections. Bersih had capitalised on this opportunity 
in mobilising for its rallies in 2007, 2011, and 2013, with the EC and the 
ruling regime, BN, bearing the brunt of the impact because they were tar-
geted as the parties responsible – and also for failing to institute reform. 
These conditions continued to persist leading up to GE14. Irregularities 
in the electoral process, as described above and in the following section 
on re-delineation, were consistently highlighted by political parties and by 
Bersih. In a survey on youth voters, 80.3 per cent responded that they do 
not think that the EC is fair and independent (Centre for Public Policy 
Studies 2018). 

2015). The EC was also lethargic in conducting voter registration exercises on 
the ground, and expected voters to take their own initiative to register themselves 
at the post office, EC office, or at selected government departments. 
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While the Bersih rallies strengthened the sense of citizenry, the move-
ment has also empowered more civic activism beyond just the rallies 
(Khoo 2018). Political opportunities at the macro level are correlational to 
collective political action at the micro one, and, as evident in GE13, Bersih 
had empowered greater electoral mobilisation and activism (Khoo 2016). 
The political opportunity arising with regards to the flaws in the electoral 
system and process in the lead-up to GE14 continued such a scenario; 
Bersih played a key role in monitoring the electoral system. As the primary 
organisation campaigning for electoral reform in Malaysia, Bersih was at 
the forefront in challenging and exposing various abuses and attempts at 
manipulating the electoral system. The Bersih Steering Committee and 
secretariat played an effective and indeed crucial role as a watchdog vis-à-
vis the EC, by monitoring its actions on various fronts such as the electoral 
roll, voter registration, changes to regulations, and the conduct of electoral 
commissioners. 
At the macro level, electoral irregularities were constantly exposed via 
both traditional and social media platforms. Sustaining publicity and 
awareness on electoral reform issues was critical because when BN re-
tained power after GE13, many voters – including Bersih supporters – 
became increasingly disillusioned and lost hope as they felt that their ef-
forts had not materialised in change. The efforts of Bersih post-GE13 
were, therefore, important in keeping the momentum, agenda, and aware-
ness of electoral reform alive throughout the period leading up to GE14. 
The high level of awareness about electoral fraud among voters was an 
important factor in influencing voter turnout, because citizens were re-
minded of the importance of their vote – and it also channelled popular 
support to PH too, because they backed the electoral reform agenda. The 
heightened awareness and empowerment resulted in many voters directly 
participating in protecting the safety of their votes during GE14. This was 
done in a variety of ways, especially by volunteering as polling and count-
ing agents (PACAs) – who played a critical role in ensuring the safe and 
proper receipt of Form 14 (Tay and Zainul 2018; Joseph 2018).7 In one 
ironic instance, a group of voters who were guarding a polling station con-
ducted a spot check on a policeman and his motorcycle before allowing 
him to enter, to ensure that he was not carrying any illegal ballots (Media 
Baharu 2018). In another incident, a group of voters mistakenly prevented 
the EC vehicle transporting ballot boxes containing counted votes to the 
tally centre, thinking that they were illegal ones (World of Buzz 2018). 

7  Form 14 refers to the official statement of the poll after counting the ballots at 
the polling stream. It is the most important document to prove and prevent ma-
nipulation of the final vote tally. 
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In other, more direct terms, Bersih launched its domestic election 
observation initiative (Pemantau) on 30 October 2017, in anticipation of 
the upcoming GE14. Among the stated goals of Pemantau were to pre-
vent electoral fraud and misconduct and to collect evidence for possible 
legal action (Bersih2.0 2017b). Via this campaign, Bersih conducted na-
tionwide trainings and briefings, and recruited over 100 coordinators and 
700 volunteers to observe, document, and report 12 categories8 of elec-
toral offenses. A total of 1,003 reports were verified by Pemantau coordi-
nators (Bersih2.0, Komas, and Suaram 2018), and periodic exposés were 
released during the campaign period to name and shame wrongdoers. 
These revelations were especially critical in directly countering the vote-
buying culture and misuse of government resources for campaigning that 
were widely prevalent throughout the pre-election period, specifically by 
naming and shaming the offenders (see, for example, Malaysiakini 2018). 
In response to the large number of unregistered voters existing due 
to EC’s suppression, Bersih launched the Undi (Vote) campaign in early 
2017. This was an intensive voter registration drive conducted nationwide 
together with its network of partners, NGOs, and grassroots volunteers. 
These individuals were on the ground throughout the campaign period, 
armed with the necessary forms and equipment so as to register voters in 
public areas with large volumes of people – such as shopping malls, night 
markets, and churches. The campaign also required sourcing and working 
closely with the limited number of available AROs and forms (FMT 
Reporters 2017a). In total, the number of new voter registration applications 
received by the EC in 2017 was 842,025, which played a key role in secur-
ing PH’s victory as these were mostly young and first-time voters. The 
number of individuals registered to vote by Bersih and its partners in 2017 
was approximately 100,000 people in total (Hendry 2018). 
In addition, Bersih consistently rallied the electorate to exercise their 
vote in all of its campaigns and actions. Considering that reforms were 
unlikely to take place, Bersih made the message loud and clear that the 
only way to defeat and reduce the effects of electoral fraud was by voters 
coming out to overwhelmingly oust the incumbent party. The call culmi-
nated in Bersih’s final campaign before GE14, launched on 11 February 
2018, “Satukan Tenaga, Kalahkan Penipuan” (literally translated as “unite 

8  The 12 categories are: bribery and vote-buying; treating and gifts; undue govern-
ment handouts/inducement; use of government machinery; excessive spend-
ing/lavish events; biased behaviour by public institutions (e.g. EC/police); ad-
vanced voting and postal voting; electoral roll problems; problems on voting day; 
racial politics, for example hate speech and discrimination; political violence, in-
timidation, and harassment during the campaign; and, other. 
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forces, defeat cheating”). During the campaign launch, Maria Chin Abdul-
lah gave a keynote speech highlighting Bersih’s journey over the past dec-
ade and urged voters to go out and repeat the 85 per cent turnout achieved 
in GE13 – the highest in the nation’s history (Alhadjri 2018). After all was 
done and dusted, the final voter turnout for GE14 was in fact 82.32 per 
cent (Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia 2018). 
5HGHOLQHDWLRQ&RQWHVWDWLRQ
The delineation of electoral boundaries is one of the key problems affect-
ing the integrity of Malaysia’s electoral system. Amendments to the Fed-
eral Constitution with regards to the functions and principles of re-delin-
eation had been made as far back as 1962. In 1974, meanwhile, amend-
ments were made to remove the limit for malapportionment, and every 
re-delineation exercise since then has only worsened malapportionment 
and gerrymandering (Wong 2018; Lim 2002). Malaysia ranked last in the 
district boundaries sub-dimension, with 10 points, in the Perceptions of 
Electoral Integrity Index (Norris, Wynter, and Cameron 2018). In GE13, 
BN only won 47 per cent of the popular vote – which translated into 133 
parliamentary seats (60 per cent). The opposition coalition, on the other 
hand, obtained 51 per cent of the popular vote, but this only translated to 
89 parliamentary seats (40 per cent).  
Constitutionally, the EC can only conduct a re-delineation exercise 
eight years after the completion of the last one. It was, therefore, widely 
expected to take place before GE14, as it was long overdue; the previous 
re-delineation had taken place in 2003. The re-delineation exercise was fi-
nally initiated by the EC in 2015 for Sarawak, and in 2016 for Peninsular 
Malaysia and Sabah.9 Under the 13th Schedule of the Federal Constitution, 
the EC must publicly display the new proposed electoral maps for 30 days. 
Any representations to object to the new maps can be filed with the EC 
by a group of 100 or more voters in the constituency affected, by the state 
government, or by the local authority. A local inquiry must then be held 
for each objection received. The EC then reviews and republishes the new 
re-delineation proposal for a second time and repeats the process of ob-
jection, local inquiry, and revision. Thereafter the final report will be sub-
mitted to the prime minister, who will table it – along with a draft order – 

9  Under Article 113(6) of the Federal Constitution, separate re-delineation reviews 
and recommendations shall be done for the states of Malaya (Peninsular Malay-
sia), Sabah, and Sarawak. 
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in parliament, for approval. If approved, the draft order will be submitted 
to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (head of state) to be brought into force. 
The intended purpose of constituency re-delineation is to correct two 
types of distortion: namely, malapportionment and gerrymandering 
(Wong, Yeong, and Ooi 2016). This is consistent with the principles that 
the EC must adhere to, as laid out in the 13th Schedule of the Federal 
Constitution. Among other things, the key principles are laid out in Sec-
tion(c) and Section 2(d) of the 13th Schedule, which are essentially provi-
sions against malapportionment and gerrymandering. Section 2(c) requires 
the number of voters in constituencies to be “approximately equal,” while 
Section 2(d) stipulates the maintenance of “local ties.” 
From the outset, the re-delineation exercise failed to reduce malap-
portionment. The final proposal passed by parliament resulted, in fact, in 
worsening malapportionment for federal constituencies in four states – 
Johor, Kedah, Malacca, and Selangor – based on the ratios between the 
smallest and largest constituencies (Bersih2.0 2018d). For instance the 
largest constituency in Selangor is Petaling Jaya with 150,439 voters, in 
comparison to the smallest one which is Sabak Bernam with 37,126 voters 
(over four times smaller). Partisan gerrymandering based on historical vot-
ing patterns – especially the packing of opposition supporters into super-
sized constituencies – and ethnic-based gerrymandering were practised; 
on the other hand, meanwhile, 59 per cent of parliamentary constituencies 
were excluded from any such re-delineation (Bersih2.0 2018d). 
In 2017, it was clear that the EC and the government were rushing to 
complete the re-delineation exercise as the upcoming general election 
loomed nearer. At that point, the re-delineation process for Peninsular 
Malaysia was being held up by court stay order in the Selangor govern-
ment’s judicial review of the constitutionality of the EC’s proposal. In 
spite of the stay order, in March 2017, the EC forcefully proceeded with 
the second public display for the re-delineation in Peninsular Malaysia by 
excluding Selangor (Carvalho and Muthiah 2017). Court cases, in particu-
lar appeals by the EC against stay orders, were fast-tracked and dismissed 
by the higher courts, raising questions about the impartiality of the judici-
ary (Bersih2.0 2017a; Tariq 2017; Lim 2017). In the second public display 
of Selangor’s re-delineation proposal, the EC hoodwinked voters by pro-
posing minimal changes to avoid having to deal with objections and hold 
local inquiries – while reverting to and “recycling” their first proposal, in 
the final report that was tabled in parliament (Bersih2.0 2018d). In addi-
tion, the EC also rushed through the second round of local inquiries in 
Selangor by arbitrarily rejecting the representations by voters (Bersih2.0 
2018a). On 28 March 2018, the final re-delineation report was pushed 
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through and passed in parliament despite the pending court cases 
(Bersih2.0 2018c). 
The EC’s and Najib Razak’s insistence on bulldozing their way 
through the re-delineation process and getting it passed before the general 
election was understandable, as it would strengthen BN’s chances of win-
ning in between eight to 12 parliamentary constituencies (Naidu 2018; 
Teoh 2018). The irregularities within the re-delineation exercise, however, 
created a political opportunity for opposition parties and civil society, as 
these shenanigans attracted significant coverage in the media and served 
to reinforce voters’ anger at both the EC and BN. 
&LWL]HQV¶2EMHFWLRQVWRDQG-XGLFLDO&RQWHVWDWLRQRI
5HGHOLQHDWLRQ
The political opportunity arising from re-delineation resulted in increased 
civic activism among voters. For the first time in history, the EC faced 
strong resistance to and challenges of its conducting and manipulating of 
re-delineation – primarily due to Bersih. From the outset, the Delineation 
Action and Research Team (Dart) was jointly launched by Bersih and En-
gage, in February 2014, as a campaign to educate – and increase the par-
ticipation of – voters ahead of the re-delineation exercise.  
The Dart campaign did what the EC should have done but failed to 
do. Bersih and the Dart team spearheaded nationwide roadshows, forums, 
and trainings in each respective state on the issue of re-delineation. Voters 
were briefed about the importance and process of re-delineation, and how 
they play a key role in it. Maps of constituency boundaries were digitalised 
to make them more user-friendly and accessible to voters. In several states, 
such as Johor, Melaka, Penang, and Selangor, local grassroots teams were 
formed to follow up on the research and develop alternative mapping pro-
posals. Objection templates and checklists, cross-referenced with the rel-
evant provisions of law and principles, were prepared to assist voters to 
file objections when re-delineation did eventually start. Bersih and Dart 
were hands-on in coordinating efforts to assist, collect, and submit objec-
tions. In comparison to the previous re-delineation in 2003/2005, the 
number of representations and objections saw an increase of 408 per cent 
for Peninsular Malaysia and 139 per cent for Sarawak.10  

10  The difference for Sabah, however, could not be ascertained conclusively 
because no official number of representations were announced – as the final 
Sabah re-delineation report was never tabled in parliament. It is likely that the 
number of objections in Sabah increased significantly as well, in line with the 
trend in Peninsular Malaysia and Sarawak. 
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7DEOH&RPSDULVRQRIWKH1XPEHURI5HSUHVHQWDWLRQV5HFHLYHGE\WKH
(&GXULQJWKHDQG5H'HOLQHDWLRQ([HU
FLVHV
 
Number of representations received by the EC 
 
 
2003/2005 2015/2016 
 
Unit of 
Review 
1st Public 
Display 
2nd Public 
Display 
Total 1st Public 
Display 
2nd Public 
Display 
Total % 
change 
Peninsular 
Malaysia 285 47 332 804 881 1,685 408 
Sarawak 26 10 36 64 22 86 139 
Sabah 66 16 82 NA NA NA NA 
6RXUFH $XWKRU¶VRZQFRPSLODWLRQEDVHGRQWKHILQDOUHSRUWVXEPLWWHGE\WKH(&WRWKH
SULPHPLQLVWHU
While the EC ignored most of the objections raised by voters vis-à-vis 
malapportionment and gerrymandering, the high number of ones submit-
ted in the 2015/2016 re-delineation exercise played an important role in 
pressuring and bringing under scrutiny the conduct of the body – thus 
deterring it from acting arbitrarily. In previous re-delineation exercises, 
where minimal objections were raised, the EC had allowed and even con-
curred with those filed by BN representatives based on political grounds 
and not principles of law.11 
In competitive authoritarianism, the judiciary offers a potential arena 
of contestation for opposition forces to challenge the regime in (Levitsky 
and Way 2002). The judiciary in Asia has also become increasing visible 
(Dressel 2012) in the judicialisation of politics, meaning “the ever-acceler-
ating of reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral 
predicaments, public policy questions and political controversies” (Hirschl 
2006: 721). Part of Bersih and Dart’s strategy to challenge the re-delinea-
tion was, therefore, also via legal contestation. Legal research and prepa-
ration were conducted by bring together lawyers, academics, and activists. 
The first re-delineation case was filed in 2015 for the Sarawak one. The 
judicial review challenge succeeded to obtain a favourable judgement from 
the Kuching high court in Sarawak. It declared the re-delineation exercise 
there null and avoid, for failing to comply with the constitutional require-
ment to provide sufficient notice to voters.  
In 2016, meanwhile, the Selangor State Government filed a judicial 
review application to declare the re-delineation proposal by the EC there 
null and void, on the grounds of malapportionment and gerrymandering. 

11  See, for example, the objection filed by Zaini Ismail, secretary of UMNO Kota 
Melaka in the 2003 re-delineation exercise (Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia 
2003).  
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This was followed by at least 21 other similar cases filed by voters, MPs, 
state governments, and local authorities to challenge re-delineation at var-
ious stages of implementation.12 Bersih, Dart, and its members were in-
volved in these legal challenges in one way or another; either in spearhead-
ing and funding them directly, by acting as counsels, or by providing tech-
nical assistance and advice.  
Although all of the re-delineation cases were eventually closed in fa-
vour of the EC,13 the large number of legal challenges witnessed was crit-
ically important in two aspects. First, these challenges opened up a new 
dimension and became test cases for the trajectory14 of the judicialisation 
of politics in Malaysia from the perspective of elections. The cases chal-
lenged and tested the relative power of different institutions – between the 
EC, the executive, judiciary, and parliament (Welsh 2018). The cases, how-
ever, also affirmed that Malaysian courts prefer to exercise judicial restraint 
(Dressel 2012) in matters of political significance. On the other hand, the 
re-delineation cases also showed internal differences in the level of judicial 
restraint exercised across the different court levels (Welsh 2018). While 
the upper ones – the Court of Appeal and Federal Court – eventually dis-
missed all the re-delineation-related cases, those in Johor, Melaka, Sarawak, 
and Selangor were successful in obtaining leave for hearings and stay or-
ders in the high court. 
Second, two of the legal cases – namely, those filed by the Selangor 
State Government and by voters in the state of Melaka – successfully ob-
tained stay orders from the court to prevent the re-delineation exercise 
from continuing. This indirectly allowed more time for the opposition par-
ties to consolidate and become stronger. The stays tied the hands of the 
EC as it could only complete the full re-delineation exercise for Peninsular 
Malaysia in March 2018, 18 months after it had first begun (Welsh 2018). 

12  For a more detailed account of the re-delineation cases, see Welsh (2018). 
13  The re-delineation legal cases were dismissed because the courts held the issue 
to be not for the judiciary but for parliament. Counsels in these cases argued that 
parliament cannot decide on matters of law, especially involving the interpreta-
tion of the constitution. In addition, MPs have a conflict of interest in deciding 
on re-delineation as it would affect the chances of their party winning. No judge-
ment on the merits of the cases were made, especially with regard to the EC’s 
gerrymandering and malapportionment. In Kerajaan Negeri Selangor versus 
Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia & 2 Ors (WA-25-186-10/2016), the court 
stated that there was no evidence provided by the EC to refute the allegations of 
malapportionment and gerrymandering. 
14  See Kanagasabai (2012), for the historical development and the patterns of the 
judicialisation of politics in Malaysia. 
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As described already, it was apparent by early 2017 that the EC and gov-
ernment were rushing to get it passed before GE14 as they bulldozed their 
way through the process via a series of questionable manoeuvres. The 
completion and passing of the new constituency boundaries was one of 
the key considerations for Prime Minister Najib Razak in determining the 
election date, as they would provide him with an electoral advantage – via 
malapportionment and gerrymandering – in numerous constituencies 
(Bersih2.0 2018d). This meant that the legal cases and stay orders effec-
tively stopped Najib Razak from calling for an early election in 2017; 
GE14 was eventually held on 9 May 2018, 42 days after the re-delineation 
proposal was eventually passed in parliament.  
The delay in holding the election was a significant factor in PH’s vic-
tory because it accorded the new-born coalition – which had only been 
informally created in September 2015 – much-needed time to consolidate 
and organise. For one thing, Mahathir and his political party, Parti Prib-
umu Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu), only officially joined the PH coalition in 
December 2016. Many other key factors and decisions that contributed to 
PH’s victory – such as the naming of the candidate for prime minister, the 
manifesto, agreed seat distribution, and the use of a joint logo – only coa-
lesced in early 2018. If the legal challenges and stay orders imposed on the 
re-delineation exercise had not materialised the new boundaries could 
have been passed in early 2017, thus paving the way for a possible GE14 
in the second half of that year – likely a disastrous outcome for PH. 
&RQFOXVLRQ
There were numerous factors that led to the democratic breakthrough wit-
nessed in GE14. Many of these were accumulated throughout the years of 
civil and political resistance in Malaysia – such as the build-up of coalition 
capital between civil society and political parties – while some only took 
place in recent times before GE14 – such as the affirmation of Mahathir 
Mohamad as the prime minister-designate. The objective of this article, 
therefore, has been to suggest that Bersih is not the only or even the pri-
mary reason for the fall of the BN government; arguably, no one single 
factor or entity could reasonably claim to be such. 
Nevertheless, Bersih has been a major force in the development of 
Malaysian democracy for over a decade now, ever since its original found-
ing. It has popularised the colour yellow into a symbol of people power in 
Malaysia – so much so that the previous government would ban Bersih’s 
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yellow T-shirts and publications. The “yellow wave” and Malaysians’ de-
sire for greater democracy and reform for the country continued into 
GE14. 
The political tsunami experienced in the 2008 general election, where 
the opposition broke BN’s two-thirds majority hold on parliament and 
won five federal states, sent a shockwave of excitement throughout Ma-
laysia. The people saw genuine hope for regime change; it did not materi-
alise in GE13, however. As Pakatan Rakyat began to disintegrate after that 
particular election, Malaysians became increasingly disillusioned and frus-
trated as years of collective effort in contesting the regime had not born 
results. Simultaneously, the regime rebounded and cracked down on op-
position politicians and activists. 
By highlighting and analysing the role of Bersih in responding to the 
three political opportunities cited in this article – the 1MDB scandal, elec-
toral manipulation, and re-delineation – it is hoped that the role and con-
tribution of Bersih to the recent democratic breakthrough in Malaysia is 
made clearer. At the most trying of times, Bersih was there to continue 
the fight. The political opportunity resulting from the 1MDB scandal gave 
room for civil society and the opposition to go on the offensive, and Ber-
sih took the lead and capitalised on them by serving as the common plat-
form for opposition forces. At same time, Bersih held firm in its agenda 
for electoral reform by closely monitoring and responding to electoral ma-
nipulation. Via the re-delineation exercise, it mobilised and coordinated 
resistance by increasing civic participation in the objection process and 
created new arenas of contestation via the judiciary. In parallel, Bersih’s 
efforts and strategies created conditions that helped contribute to PH’s 
eventual victory in GE14. 
Three general elections after the first Bersih rally was held, a major 
breakthrough has finally happened. In the context of an electoral authori-
tarian regime, the role of Bersih as a sustained democratic movement and 
in making electoral reform a primary point of contestation was key. How-
ever, it is yet to be seen whether Malaysia will transition into an electoral 
democracy. Early signs have been positive; the new government has 
shown genuine political will to reform the EC, and has announced that 
the latter will now report directly to parliament. In the meantime, Bersih 
has also finally been invited and accredited by the EC as observers for 
several by-elections since GE14. At the time of writing, six members of 
the EC – including the chairperson – have resigned. In this context, Bersih 
still has an important role to play in the continuing democratisation of 
Malaysia, especially with regards to electoral reform. 
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